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ABSTRACT
HOW KANT WOULD CHOOSE TO DIE:
A KANTIAN DEFENSE OF EUTHANASIA
By
Jennifer A. Bulcock
University o f New Hampshire, December, 2006

Legalizing euthanasia could have a serious impact on society and therefore
requires careful attention be paid to the ethical issues involved. The two arguments
advanced in this essay are: 1) that a consensus needs to be reached as to how to define the
concept of autonomy in the euthanasia debate and 2) the application of Kantian autonomy
to the euthanasia debate is only appropriate in making an argument that advanced
directives, made by a present rational self for a future arational self, can legitimately
specify conditions under which euthanasia should occur. To effectively make these
arguments, an examination of Immanuel Kant’s theory of suicide is presented and
extended to euthanasia and competing theories of autonomy are discussed. Kant’s
autonomy will be established as the better definition and then used to support a defense
of euthanasia where one makes a request for euthanasia through the means of an
advanced directive.

v
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INTRODUCTION

Discussions of suicide can be found in the pages of Plato’s Phaedo1 and also in
the ph ilosophies of Aristotle, Cicero, Seneca, Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius, and many
more.2 The philosophies advanced by the Ancients had a strong influence on the
philosophers of the eighteenth century. As Lester Crocker explains: “The men of the
Enlightenment took their cues from the Greek and Roman philosophers, and range
themselves, according to their faith, either with Plato or Aristotle or with the Epicurean
and Stoic writers who in the matter of suicide were bedfellows.”3 Immanuel Kant is no
exception, as he aligned himself with the Stoics in matters of his moral philosophy. Kant,
like the Stoics, believed in rationality, living in accordance with the natural law, and that
man’s life is granted by God. One point of divergence between Kant and the Stoics,
however, is in the permissibility of suicide.
In Kant’s writings on suicide, it appears he is directly addressing the Stoic view
and attempting to discredit their beliefs.4 As Kant recounts in Metaphysical Principles o f

1Plato, “Phaedo,” in Readings in Ancient Greek Philosophy: From Thales to Aristotle, ed. Marc S. Cohen,
Patricia Curd, and CDC R eeve, (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 2000), 248-251.

2 Michael J. Seidler, “Kant and the Stoics on Suicide,” Journal o f the History ofIdeas, 44 no. 3 (Jul-Sept
1983): 429-453.
3 Lester G. Crocker, “The Discussion of Suicide in the Eighteenth Century,” Journal of the History of
Ideas, 13 no. 1 (Jan 1952), 48.
4 David N. James, “Suicide and Stoic Ethics in the Doctrine o f Virtue,n Kant-Studien, 90(1999): 40-58.

1

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Virtue5, “The Stoic.. .considered it a prerogative of his personality as a wise man to walk
out of his life with an undisturbed mind whenever he liked (as out of a smoke-filled
room), not because he was afflicted by actual or anticipated ills, but simply because he
could make use of nothing more in this life.”6 Kant, on the other hand, believed that the
“strength of mind” shown by such an honorable man and the courageous mastery of the
idea of death was all the more reason to preserve one’s life. One must endorse the
principle: “I do not employ my freedom against myself for my own destruction, and.. .1
do not let it be limited by anything external.”7 For what is essential to Kant is selfpreservation and the protection of one’s humanity. At the same time, one must both avoid
the influence of the external world and subordinate one’s desires to rationality. For Kant,
one cannot coherently entertain the choice to commit suicide, because it seeks to destroy
that which gives one the very capacity to make choices.
While the issue of suicide has been and will always be a topic of great contention,
the debate has grown in modem times to include euthanasia. Euthanasia differs from
o

suicide m that it is discussed m the context of medical ethics and normally requires the
consultation and/or assistance of a medical professional. The ethical issues that become
important when making determinations about the acceptability of suicide also come into
play when examining euthanasia. For Kant, the primary ethical concerns involve one’s

5 Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysical Principles o f Virtue, trans. James Ellington. (New York: The BobbsMerrill Company, Inc., 1964).
6 Ibid, 83.
7 Immanuel Kant, Lectures on Ethics, ed. Peter Heath and J.B. Schneewind. (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1997), 148.
* Here I am referring to the traditional conception o f suicide, not including physician-assisted suicide,
which is also a hot topic for debate.

2

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

duty of self-preservation and also the conditional relationship between the mind and the
body. While Kant’s writings do not address euthanasia, one can extend his theory of
suicide to apply to euthanasia, because the issues he takes into account focus around the
premature (not natural) ending of one’s life and not the specifics of the act of suicide.
In current debates over euthanasia, the concept that is most widely employed and
examined is one’s right to autonomy. Unfortunately, there is no standardized definition of
autonomy in the literature, confusing the debate. There are a number of different theories
of autonomy, however, that share similar characteristics in their definitions. Tom
Beauchamps has found that, “autonomy is generally understood as personal selfgovernance: personal rule of the self free of controlling interferences by others and free
of personal limitations that prevent choice. Two basic conditions of autonomy, therefore,
are (1) liberty (independence from controlling influences); and (2) agency (capacity for
intentional action).”9 These attributes that are at the root of most concepts of autonomy
have been the target of a number of different criticisms waged by feminist and
communitarian theorists. Such theorists find that “it is a narrow view of self as
“atomistic,” as cut off from others,”10 and such a view bars one from considering the
opinions of one’s friends, family, and community. The constant disagreement among
theorists as to what should constitute the basics of autonomy and even what
characteristics it should share more generally cause confusion in bioethical discussion.

9 Tom L. Beauchamps, “Who Deserves Autonomy, and Whose Autonomy Deserves Respect?,” in Personal
Autonomy: New Essays on Personal Autonomy and Its Role in Contemporary Moral Philosophy, ed. James
Stacey Taylor, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 310.
10 Thomas May, The Concept o f Autonomy in Bioethics, in Personal Autonomy: New Essays on Personal
Autonomy and Its Role in Contemporary Moral Philosophy, ed. James Stacey Taylor, (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2005), 303.

3
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While the problem of defining autonomy is a broad issue for bioethics in general,
it also has an impact on Kantians as different strains of Kantian autonomy emerge.11
While Kant’s moral philosophy is deeply rooted in one’s autonomy (one’s ability to selfgovem), the modem conception of autonomy is not a direct descendent of Kantian
theory, although many mistake it to be. Many bioethicists who consider themselves
Kantians make this crucial error. T.A. Mappes and D. Grazia argue that “what Kant calls
the “dignity of man as a rational creature” is due to human beings possessing just that
property that enables them to govern their own actions in accordance with rales of their
own choosing.”12 The modem conception is concerned primarily with external factors
and leans more towards the idea of self-determination13, whereas Kant was concerned
with internal factors and one’s ability to use one’s will to make decisions based upon
universal laws and duty.14 Even though there is a clear distinction between Kant’s
autonomy and the modem conception of autonomy, some still credit them both to Kant.
This complicates the practical application of Kantian ethics to euthanasia, because one
can never be sure of the true import of an argument based on autonomy if the concept is
somewhat elusive.

11 This issue is addressed explicitly in: Barbara Seeker, “The Appearance of Kant’s Deontology in
Contemporary Kantianism: Concepts of Patient Autonomy in Bioethics,” Journal o f Medicine and
Philosophy, 24 no. 1 (1999): 43-66. & Michio Miyasaka, “Resourcifying human bodies - Kant and
bioethics,” Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy, 8 (2005): 19-27.
12 Seeker, 47. qtd Mappes, T.A. and D. DeGrazia (1996).
13 Self-determination in the specific sense that not only does one have control over their life, but the
decisions one makes are based only on what one wants and not necessarily in accord with universal
principles.
14 Miyasaka, 19-27.
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A defense of euthanasia will be made by measuring the rational capacities of an
individual and deciding at what point the conditional relationship that Kant acknowledges
between the body and the mind ceases to exist. Once an individual has reached this point,
the body is no longer required to support the rational capacities of the mind and one may
choose to dispose of one’s body as one chooses. Given the object-like status the body
achieves at this point, one would be ethically justified in terminating one’s physical
existence, since it is no longer a necessary component of preserving one’s humanity and
in turn morality.
Most conversations about euthanasia discuss the concept of autonomy and one’s
right to choose in the context of a rational individual willing to terminate herself with her
current capacities intact. Kant would find this to be problematic because a rational
individual should never seek to shorten her life unless doing so in honor of another,
superior moral duty. Given this objection, it would appear that the concept of autonomy,
for Kant, would be entirely misplaced in the euthanasia debate. However, the use of
autonomy finds its place when considering a rational individual establishing an advanced
directive to determine the treatment of a future arational self. Once one has reached the
state of arationality, the body’s status is demoted to that of a mere object, but an object
that belongs to the individual.15 This allows for an individual to make an ethical decision
about herself in a future state, as she has the right to dispose over her body (as an object)
in anyway she chooses. Because the body has become an object, the autonomous decision
she makes is morally justified.

15 In a situation where one has died without an advanced directive or specific instructions of how to deal
with the body in a will, the family and/or executor would be able to make such decisions.

5
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The two main arguments that will be advanced in this essay are: 1) a consensus
needs to be reached in defining autonomy within the euthanasia debate for the purpose of
implementing real-world policies16 and, additionally, Kantian theories of autonomy
should be rightfully distinguished as such; and 2) the application of Kantian autonomy to
the euthanasia debate is only appropriate in making an argument that advanced directives,
made by a present rational self for a future arational, self can legitimately specify
conditions under which euthanasia should occur. To advance these two arguments, an
exposition of Kant’s position on suicide will be presented and later developed to
accommodate the issue of euthanasia. I will then present Kant’s concept of autonomy in
comparison with other concepts of autonomy to be found in the euthanasia debate. Once
a firm understanding of Kant’s theories of suicide and autonomy and their application to
euthanasia has been achieved, a Kantian defense of euthanasia will be advanced.

161 am not requiring that the concept o f autonomy be rigidly defined for all purposes, however, I do believe
that sufficient agreement needs to be achieved for the purpose o f being able to use the concept in real world
applications.

6
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CHAPTER I

THE BASICS OF EUTHANASIA17

Before moving into the philosophical arguments, an understanding of euthanasia
and the accepted medical terminology is instrumental. The American Medical
Association (AMA) has adopted the CEJA Report B-A-91, “Decisions Near the End of
Life,” as its policy for addressing euthanasia. The report defines four “medical actions”
that can lead to death: withholding/withdrawing life-sustaining treatment, the provision
of palliative treatment that may forseeably hasten death, euthanasia, and physicianassisted suicide.
Life-sustaining treatment is “any medical treatment that serves to prolong life
without reversing the underlying medical condition”18. This treatment includes, but is not
limited to, such things as artificial nutrition and hydration. The term “passive euthanasia”
has been used to refer to the withholding or withdrawing of life-sustaining treatment.
“Passive euthanasia” has proved to be an appropriate term for some, since they believe
the only difference between euthanasia and withholding life-sustaining treatment is
whether the doctor performs or omits an act. The medical community, however, resists

17 This section, although modified in places, has previously appeared in: Jennifer Bulcock, “Euthanasia: A
Humanitarian End,” The WRIToracle (Dec 2005). http://www.thewrit.org.
18

American Medical Association, “CEJA Report B-A-91 :Decisions Near the End o f Life.”
http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/pub/categorv/3840.html.
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the use of the term.
Palliative treatment is a treatment with the intent “to relieve pain and suffering,
not to end the patient’s life, but the patient’s death is a foreseeable side-effect of the
treatment”19 This treatment has also been called “double-effect euthanasia,” which is
derived from the “principle of double-effect,” a common principle in Western medical
ethics. The principle allows a procedure to produce bad consequences if “the act one
engaged in is not itself bad, the bad consequence is not a means to the good consequence,
the bad consequence is foreseen but not intended, and there is sufficiently serious reason
Oft

for allowing the bad consequence to occur.” An example would be giving increasingly
heavy dosages of morphine to a patient in the advanced stages of cancer to ease her pain.
The intent of the increased dosage of morphine is to ease the pain and suffering of the
individual, however, at the same time, high doses of morphine may quicken the death for
the patient. Even though the medication hastens death, the intent of the dosage was to
ease pain, not cause death, so it is therefore acceptable and not considered to be
euthanasia by the AMA.
‘Euthanasia,’ a word of Greek origin, once meant “gentle death.” The AMA
recognizes a commonplace definition of euthanasia to be “the act of bringing about the
death of a hopelessly21 ill and suffering person in a relatively quick and painless way for

19 AMA website
20 John Keown, Euthanasia, Ethics, and Public Policy: An Argument Against Legislation, (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2002), 20.
21 The AMA does not give an explicit definition of “hopelessly” ill, but the context it is presented in
suggests that ‘hopelessly’ is referring to the condition o f a patient who is terminally ill and in the end stages
o f life.

8
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reasons of mercy.”22 The AMA, however, for the purpose of its policy, narrows the
definition to “the medical administration of a lethal agent to a patient for the purpose of
relieving the patient’s intolerable and incurable suffering.23 24” There are three species of
euthanasia - voluntary, non-voluntary, and involuntary. Voluntary euthanasia is when the
patient willingly asks for and competently consents to having a particular life-ending
treatment (most commonly lethal injection)25. Non-voluntary euthanasia involves a
patient who is no longer competent to make a decision, so the attending physician and
family members have to. Lastly, involuntary euthanasia would involve performing the
procedure against the will of a competent patient. The AMA refuses to acknowledge the
legitimacy of involuntary euthanasia because “it is difficult to imagine a merciful
assistance to death ever occurring against a competent person’s will.”26 27

22 AMA website
23 In the report, the AMA appears to understand intolerable suffering as an issue of excessive and
uncontrollable physical pain and incurable suffering as referring to the inability o f curing one’s current
illness. It does not appear that the AMA is considering mental illness in this definition. The AMA is aware
that many patients who are seriously ill suffer mentally in a number of different ways, but in this definition
I believe they are referring only to diseases o f die body and not of the mind. The report focuses on
individuals who are terminally ill and nearing the end o f their lives, not taking into account other
individuals who are ill or disabled in other ways and may have an interest in euthanasia. However, the
report does acknowledge that “allowing euthanasia to be a medical treatment for a limited group of patients
who may truly benefit from it will present difficult line drawing problems for medicine and society.” AMA
website
24 AMA website
251 would contend that an advanced directive would fall under the category o f voluntary euthanasia.

However, there is the potential for disputes to arise as to whether it is really voluntary if for example, one
were to recess to a state o f arationality and in that state contest the advanced directive one had previously
made as a rational being.
26 AMA website.
27 The AMA refuses to recognize involuntary euthanasia because the taking o f a competent individual’s life
against her will is by no means a “merciful death” and can be likened to murder.

9
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Physician-assisted suicide “occurs when a physician facilitates a patient’s death
by providing the necessary means and/or information to enable a patient to perform the
life-ending act (e.g. the physician provides sleeping pills and information about the lethal
dose, while aware the patient is intending to commit suicide).” Physician-assisted
suicide and euthanasia are very similar, but the distinguishing factor is the extent of
involvement by the physician. The AMA believes that physician-assisted suicide is
preferable to euthanasia, because in merely providing a means and properly advising a
patient, the patient is still in control of the process from beginning to end. When a patient
asks to be euthanized, the physician holds some degree of power and control and the
patient may be deprived of the leisure to fully think through the prospect of ending one’s
life.
It appears that the main reason why the AMA will not endorse a policy in support
of physician-assisted suicide is the involvement of doctors and the potential negative
effects it could have on the doctor-patient relationship. As stated in the report,
Though the principle of patient autonomy requires that patients who possess
decision-making capacity be given the opportunity to choose among offered
medical treatments..., it does not give patients the right to demand euthanasia. At
issue is whether it is ever ethical for physicians to offer euthanasia in certain
circumstances. On the other hand, there is an autonomy interest in directing one’s
death. But this interest does not override considerations of professional
responsibility.29
The issues that the AMA address are important to patients and medical personnel alike.
However, the primary goal of the AMA appears to be protecting the role of medical
doctors and preserving the moral code by which they operate.

28 AMA website.
29 Ibid.

10
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The CEJA report on “Decisions Near the End of Life,” although published in
1991, is still endorsed as the AMA’s policy for medical actions that can lead to death (the
four means discussed above). The policy allows for palliative treatment and the
withholding/withdrawing of life-sustaining treatment, but still stands firmly against
euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide. The decision to allow or disallow certain
procedures were based on three considerations: 1) the principle of patient autonomy and
the corresponding obligation of physicians to respect patient’s choices; 2) whether what
is offered by the physician is sound medical treatment; and 3) the potential consequences
of a policy that permits physicians to act in a way that would lead to a patient’s death.30
In allowing palliative care and withholding/withdrawing life-sustaining treatment,
it is believed that the individual has the right to decide whether to undergo sometimes
evasive and emotionally and physically taxing procedures based on their “subjective
preferences and values.” The case of a Jehovah’s Witness refusing a blood transfusion is
“3 1

mentioned as an example , keeping in mind that the decision in this case was upheld in
the courts. While it is the physician’s duty to heal patients, this duty is contingent upon a
patient who accepts the proposed treatment. The main point here is that the patient’s
autonomy32 must be respected in deciding whether to initiate a specific treatment plan.

30 AMA website.
31 Ibid.
32 The use of autonomy, in this instance only, is referring to the individual’s right to choice in the medical
context. The meaning of autonomy here is not used in the Kantian sense that will later be discussed.
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CHAPTER II

KANT’S THEORY OF SUICIDE

One can find discussions of suicide in many of Kant’s works, including his
Lectures on Ethics33, Foundations o f the Metaphysics o f Morals34, and Metaphysical
Principles o f Virtue35.36 Kant’s writings reveal his strong opposition to the moral
permissibility of suicide. He does, however, admit that “suicide can be considered under
various aspects, from the blameworthy, the permissible37, and even the heroic point of
view.”38 His reluctance to allow for a permissible choice to end one’s own life is rooted
in the self-contradictory nature of the act. Humanity is what gives humans the faculty of
autonomous, rational choice, and for one to will the demise of one’s humanity is an
offense to one’s duty to preserve it. Therefore Kant considered suicide to be “the supreme
OQ

violation of duties to oneself.”

33 Lectures.
34 Immanuel Kant, Foundations o f the Metaphysics of Morals, ed. Lewis White Beck, (New Jersey:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1997).
35 Kant.
36 These texts will be the primary texts used to discuss Kant’s view of suicide in this essay.
37 Kant’s strongest example of a permissible suicide act appears in his Lectures on Ethics. Found in Collin’s
lecture notes on Kant’s moral philosophy in a section entitled O f Suicide, Kant discussed Cato’s suicide
motivated by his desire to save his country from Caesar.
38 Lectures, 144.
39 Ibid., 124.

12
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One’s personhood is the most important characteristic of a human being for Kant.
Humans and no other animal are capable of possessing humanity, because it serves as the
foundation of one’s rational capabilities and is essential to the existence of morality. Kant
explains,
Personhood, or humanity in [one’s] person, is conceived as an intelligible
substance, the seat of all concepts, that which distinguishes man in his freedom
from all objects under whose jurisdiction he stands in his visible nature. It is
thought of, therefore, as a subject that is destined to give moral laws to man, and
to determine him: as occupant of the body, to whose jurisdiction the control of all
man’s powers is subordinated. There is thus lodged in man an unlimited capacity
that can be determined to operate in his nature through himself alone, and not
through anything else in nature. This is freedom, and through it we may recognize
the duty of self-preservation, which cannot, therefore, be plainly demonstrated.40

Here Kant is illuminating the idea that humanity is the basis of one’s morality and in turn
is how one is able to experience freedom. Freedom, for Kant, is not the right to choose or
the prohibition of external constraints; one has freedom of the will. One is free because
one is an autonomous agent and, as such, one has adopted a set of universal moral
principles by which one governs oneself and is therefore able to make rational decisions.
Kant’s freedom is essentially the ability to self-govem. In being free, one puts aside her
happiness (which is driven by the physical world) and adopts the freedom of selfgovernment. Kant’s description of humanity, as a subject, emphasizes the idea that
humanity guides one’s life; it is the core of one’s existence. As such, happiness and one’s
human instinct and worldly desires are subordinated to the moral laws that are dictated by
humanity. One’s body is what prompts “happiness,” but it is also the vessel that humanity

inhabits. This is how Kant substantiates the duty of self-preservation. Humanity is in a

40 Lectures, 369.

13
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sense more significant than the individual and as such demands it be preserved. In Kant’s
words, “humanity is in itself an inviolable holiness, wherein my personhood, or the right
of humanity in my person, is no less inviolably contained. It demands the duty of
morality, and it is only man who demands happiness, which must be unconditionally
subordinated to morality.”41 Self-preservation is a duty because humanity is more
significant than the individual and therefore should receive priority.
Kant opposed suicide not because of the harm done to the concrete object of the
body, but the violence done to humanity. In Kant’s words, “duties to oneself relate, not to
the man as a physical subject, but always to the right of humanity in his person, or the
right that it has over him and his person.”42 The human body, for Kant, is an object that
achieves special status because of its conditional relationship with the mind, and it
therefore cannot be treated as a mere object.43 Despite the special status of the body,
one’s humanity remains the ultimate concern for Kant. Without humanity, there can be
no rational thought or a moral system to govern oneself.44 One’s humanity allows one to
be a self-governing agent, and through self-government and the recognition of universal

41 Lectures, 369.
42 Ibid., 350.
43 The conditional relationship between the body and one’s mind (humanity) is what gives special status to
the body. The status o f the body is promoted from that of an object to an integral part o f what constitutes
the self. The self, constituted by humanity and its relationship with the body, cannot be treated like an
object and therefore gives the body special protections from harm and being used in damaging ways to
promote the ends of the individual. Kant requires that the body be disciplined and kept in peak condition to
benefit one’s humanity. If this relationship did not exist, one would be able to treat die body as one would
any other object However, as I will discuss later, if one’s mind (humanity) was not tied to a specific body,
Kant would not require the same special treatment o f the body.
44 If one were to terminate one’s life and therefore dispose of one’s humanity, it is true that humanity would
still exist in the world, since others would still be alive and in possession o f humanity. However, for Kant
to allow for suicide, it would have to be a universal maxim (able to pass the test o f the categorical
imperative), which would mean that it would be acceptable for all humans to kill themselves, thus
extinguishing humanity completely.

14
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maxims, a system of morality is established. One, being a self-governing agent, cannot
will the demise of one’s existence as a self-governing agent. For Kant, even the idea of
willing such an action is an inherent contradiction.
To understand the contradiction, Kant explains it within the context of humans
and animals, keeping in mind that that which distinguishes humans from animals is one’s
rationality and autonomy. He
who fails to respect his humanity, who turns himself into a thing, becomes an
object of free choice for everyone; anyone, thereafter, may do as he pleases with
him; he can be treated by others as an animal or a thing; he can be dealt with like
a horse or dog, for he is no longer a man; he has turned himself into a thing, and
so cannot demand that others should respect the humanity in him, since he has
already thrown it away himself.45
If one chooses to forfeit one’s humanity, as one does in the act of suicide, by willing the
end of one’s humanity, then one is no longer a part of the moral world “for the worth of
the person constitutes moral worth.”46 One cannot expect others to treat one with the
dignity and respect that humanity warrants, because one has turned oneself into an object
or an animal. Essentially, “a being who existed of his own necessity could not possibly
destroy himself; one who does not exist by such necessity sees his life as the condition of
all else.”47 One has lost one’s ability to understand oneself as a self-governing agent
capable of making decisions in accord with the universal maxims one has adopted.
Instead, the individual sees herself as conditioned by everything else in the world. Her
existence is contingent upon the circumstances of the world around her and she is no
longer able to employ rationality to make moral decisions for herself. The gifts humanity

45 Lectures, 147.
46 Ibid., 125.
47 Metaphysics, 147.
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has bestowed upon her are no longer being utilized and therefore no other can be
expected to respect her as such.
To make the contradiction Kant is driving at more explicit, he walks the reader
through the process of contemplating suicide and describes why it is wrong. He begins
with an individual who is in despair and weary with life and “is still in possession of his
reason sufficiently to ask whether it would not be contrary to his duty to himself to take
his own life” and subsequently asks “whether the maxim of his action could become a
universal law of nature.”48 It is important to Kant that one still be in possession of his
rational capacities, because an arational man is not bound by the laws of morality. In
addition, one’s maxim must be universalizable, otherwise one’s action could not be part
of the moral law. The maxim the suicidal individual must examine is “For love of myself,
I make it my principle to shorten my life when by a longer duration it threatens more evil
than satisfaction.”49 Kant would object to this maxim first because the cost/benefit
analysis between evil and satisfaction pertains to the idea of happiness, which is a
utilitarian concern and not one of moral value to Kant. He also finds that “it is contrary to
morality, for the intention is, by sacrificing one’s condition, to abandon at a stroke all the
pains and hardships of life; but in so doing, humanity is subordinated to animal nature,
and my understanding is under the sway of animal impulse; and if so, I contradict myself
when I demand to have rights to humanity.”50 What Kant means is, when a human being
chooses to commit suicide, she is giving in to the animal nature of her physical existence

48 Metaphysics, 38.
49 Ibid., 38.
50Lectures, 70.

16

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

and allowing herself to be overcome by those things in life that she finds to be unpleasant
or painful. The individual is trying to achieve a state of happiness that has no moral worth
to Kant. She should be under the discipline of her humanity and choosing to persist in life
as she would be instructed to by her rationality.
In addition, the problem lies with the idea that “a man uses his freedom to destroy
himself, when he ought to use it solely to live as a man; he is able to dispose over
everything pertaining to his person, but not over that person itself, nor can he use his
freedom against himself.”51 What is essential here is that while man does have the
freedom to dispose over himself; one’s freedom is not absolute when humanity itself is in
question. “It transcends all limits on the use of free choice, for the latter is only possible
if the subject exists.” 52
One can see why Kant would deny that suicide is a moral choice, given that in the
act one destroys one’s morality. However, Kant does allow for suicide in a limited
number of situations. Broadly speaking, Kant allows for suicide only in situations where
choosing to stay alive would force an individual to commit an immoral act. Simply
stated, “It remains ... contemptible and contrary to duty, to promote the maintenance of
life at the price of one’s morality.”53 “For example, if someone were to be promised
death, or the enjoyment of a happy life at the price of shameful treason or other criminal
act,”54 one should choose death. While this example demonstrates the hierarchy of duties

51 Lectures, 124.
52 Ibid. 145.
53 Ibid., 370.
54 Ibid., 370.
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that Kant outlines when the duty of self-preservation and another moral duty come into
conflict, it is not an example of justified suicide. Kant would not find one’s choice to die
by the hands of another instead of committing an immoral act to be suicide, because of
the lack of one’s intention to die.
One may be hard-pressed to find an example of suicide that would seem to make
sense under this exception and not contradict Kant’s overarching philosophy of suicide.
Kant himself admits only to the example of Cato, who chose to end his life so that the
Romans would continue fighting for freedom and not succumb to the hands of Caesar if
he chose to live. In Kant’s moral philosophy, it is not the outcome of an action that one
should be concerned with, but the intention behind it. The most important component of
suicide for Kant is “the intention to destroy oneself.”55 By defining suicide in terms of
intention, it allows Kant to discount soldiers marching into a guaranteed death and other
situations that share a similar context, from the category of suicide. The intention in such
instances is not to destroy life, but instead to fulfill a duty. In Kant’s words, “the man of
inner worth is not afraid of death.. .There are duties.. .to which life is much inferior, and
in order to fulfill them we must evince no cowardice in regard to our life. The cowardice
of man dishonours humanity, and it is very cowardly to set too much store by physical
life.”56
While Kant makes clear that he has a ranking of duties that can trump one’s duty
of self-preservation, at no point does he make explicit which duties these are. He states

55 Lectures, 146.
56

Ibid., 150.
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that “it would never be sufficiently determined, whether and when I might shorten my
life.”57 However, he does find that “it is permitted to venture one’s life against the danger
of losing it; yet it can never be allowable for me deliberately to yield up my life, or to kill
myself in the fulfillment of a duty to others.”58 It appears that Kant has an idea of what
duties would take priority over self-preservation, but cannot endorse a wholesale defense
of any particular duty.
The competing moral duties that Kant draws out in these instances are the duty of
self-preservation and the duty to live honourably. While Kant does not give one the
absolute right to dispose over one’s life, he encourages one to preserve one’s virtuous
nature over one’s continued existence. Kant asserts that “if [one] can preserve [one’s] life
only by disreputable conduct, virtue absolves [one] from the duty of preserving it;
because here a higher duty beckons and passes judgment on [the individual].”59 In other
words, “it is not necessary to live, but it is necessary that, so long as we live, we do so
honourably.”60 It appears that in certain instances, one’s duties trump self-preservation,
because if one is not fulfilling the duties set forth by the moral law, then one is choosing
to avoid death out of self-love and a desire to continue living not for reasons of morality
but for the enjoyment of life. The motivation of the individual in this case appears to be
more animalistic than rational, and the moral action would be to honor one’s humanity by
fulfilling a duty and in turn accepting death.

57Lectures, 369.
58 Ibid., 370.
59 Ibid., 151.
60 Ibid., 147.
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From the above discussion of Kant’s theory of suicide, one can see that Kant does
not permit suicide for the purpose of “[disposing] of oneself as a mere means to some end
of one’s own liking.”61 Suicide is not an answer to one’s unhappiness or life’s despair. In
choosing to commit suicide, one is essentially surrendering one’s right to humanity and in
turn the dignity and respect that humanity is afforded. Kant does, however, permit suicide
in cases that would require an individual to perform a dishonourable and immoral act for
the sole purpose of preserving one’s existence. While Kant affords the duty of selfpreservation high esteem, he realizes that it is subordinate to the duty of preserving one’s
humanity. This distinction made by Kant allows him to strictly narrow the definition of
suicide so that it includes only those instances where one wills the end of humanity to
increase one’s happiness or to escape from hardship and not those instances where one
strives to live honourably until one’s last breath is drawn.62

61 Lectures, 84.
62 While Kant allows for the subordination of self-preservation in the interest of preserving humanity, not
all instances in which one would have to commit a dishonourable act would constitute an exception. It
appears that Kant has a hierarchy o f moral duties in mind, but he never explicitly states the rankings of
such duties and even appears to believe judgments need to be made in reference to individual cases.
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CHAPTER m

KANT’S THEORY OF SUICIDE AS APPLIED TO EUTHANASIA

The moral issues that Kant is concerned with in evaluating suicide are shared by
euthanasia. The conditional relationship between the physical body and the mind and the
preservation of humanity, are the key issues in determining whether the intentional and
premature ending of one’s life is moral. Kant forbids suicide unless the individual is
threatened by the mandatory performance of a dishonourable act. The same would hold
true for euthanasia, and in most instances the threat of a dishonourable act is not present.
Therefore, one would not be allowed to consider euthanasia in order to escape pain or to
avoid the displeasure of suffering from a disease. To better understand how Kant would
regard euthanasia requires a discussion of the connection between the physical body and
the self.
Kant believes that “the most excruciating pains and irremediable bodily sufferings
[could not] give a man the authority to take his own life.” This stems from Kant’s belief
that the body and its desires should not have an impact on one’s self nor its rational
capacities. To avoid undue influence on the mind from the body, Kant believes that
the body must first be disciplined, because in it there are principia by which the
mind is affected, and through which the body alters the state of the mind. The
mind must therefore take care to exercise an autocracy over the body, so that it

63 Lectures, 369.
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cannot alter the state of the mind. The mind must maintain supremacy over the
body, so that it may guide the latter according to moral and pragmatic principia
and maxims.64
Kant carves out a specific role for the body: the body is to be in a constant state of
discipline so that it does not affect one’s rational choosing, but the body is also
recognized as a vessel of great importance. Without the body, the mind and its rational
capacities would not exist; humanity and morality would necessarily cease to exist as
well. Therefore the mind and humanity’s existence are conditional upon the continued
functioning o f the body. Kant realized that “to prevent [the body] from affecting the mind
is doubtless impossible”65 because of the necessary interconnectedness of the two, but the
body gains its worth only through its disciplined existence.
The issue of conditionality between the mind66 and body is the most important
element of Kant’s theory in relation to euthanasia. Kant wrote:
If the body belonged to life in a contingent way, not as a condition of life, but as a
state of it, so that we could take it off if we wanted; if we could slip out of one
body and enter another, like a country, then we could dispose over the body, it
would then be our subject of free choice, albeit that in that case we would not be
disposing over our life, but only over our state, over the moveable goods, the
chattels, that pertain to life.67
The only value the body has for Kant stems from its being a condition of the mind. The
protection, discipline, and perfection Kant requires in one’s treatment o f the body are
only mandated because negative impact on the body in turn negatively impacts the mind.

64 Lectures, 151.
65 Ibid, 151.
66 Here, “mind” refers to Kant’s understanding o f rational capacities and humanity.
61 Lectures, 144.
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If one were able to regard one’s body as a disposable and replaceable object, as one’s
property, then Kant would not require the same treatment.
The current relationship that exists between the mind and body necessitates the
existence of one particular body for the mind to continue functioning. If the mind could
exist in a manner that would allow for it to transfer from body to body with no particular
body necessitated for its existence, then one’s body would no longer have special status.
The body would become fungible and serve only an instrumental purpose, with no
particular body having an essential connection to the existence of humanity. In one’s
current state, bound by the survival of a specific body, the freedom granted by one’s
humanity is only exercisable through the existence of the physical body. More
specifically, “the body is the total condition of life, so that we have no other concept of
our existences save that mediated by our body, and since the use of our freedom is
possible only through the body, we see that the body constitutes a part of our self.”68
The connection that Kant acknowledges between the physical body and one’s
mind is the most important part o f his theory as it pertains to suicide and euthanasia. One
may make the argument that because one’s body is one’s own, one has the right to do
with it as one pleases, but the conditional relationship between the body and one’s
humanity is what limits this freedom. As Kant has said, if one were able to “move from
body to body as one would a country”, then doing violence to one’s physical body would
be a matter of mere choice. One’s authority over the body could be likened to that of
another material possession, such as a car or a locket, which one may choose to transfer
ownership of, mutilate, or even destroy. The body would essentially have the

68 Lectures, 144.
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characteristics of any other fungible object, because the existence of one’s humanity
would in no way depend upon the health or longevity of that given body.
The status Kant grants to the body based on its relationship with the mind allows
one to see why Kant would move to prohibit euthanasia. What is despicable for Kant in
the act of suicide is the inherent contradiction in destroying oneself, and in turn one’s
freedom, by using one’s freedom against itself. The same holds true for euthanasia, since
an argument based on pain and the existence of an alternative immoral action are not
present and therefore cannot constitute an exception for Kant.
At this point it may not appear clear how Kantian theory can be employed as a
defense of euthanasia, however, we have not yet examined its use in regard to individuals
who are no longer in possession of their rational capacities. Given the discussion above
of the relationship between the mind and body, one can see that the body holds a special
status only so long as it belongs to a rational human being and one’s body is a condition
of humanity’s existence. This opens the door for one to request that her life69 be
terminated once rational thought has ceased. Kant clearly values those rational capacities
that humans possess from the continued existence of humanity within oneself. If an
individual sacrifices her humanity in the attempted act of suicide, then no one is bound to
treat and respect her as one in possession of humanity. One can logically conclude from
this that if one were no longer capable of displaying the traits of a being that is in
possession of humanity, one would be free to dispose of one’s body as one would choose.

69 Life here referring only to the physical functioning o f the body and not humanity as it is related to the
body.
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A complication arises when taking into account that only an arational human
being could be ethically justified in ending her life.70 However, if an individual is
arational and no longer possesses those faculties that guarantee that one possesses the
rights and respect of humanity, then she is not capable of making an autonomous
71

choice. Essentially, one can only achieve the proper disjunction between the mind
(humanity) and the body if one’s rational capacities degenerate to the point o f arationality
and then, and only then, is one able to terminate the physical body, because the life of the
mind has already ceased to exist. In terms of euthanasia, this would leave an arational
individual charged with the duty o f making a choice which she is not rationally or
ethically qualified to make.
While an arational individual is unqualified to make a choice to terminate her own
life, a previous rational self would be able to make that decision.72 If, as Kant points out,
our humanity and our capacities as humans are contingent upon the continued existence
of a specific physical body that as such becomes “a part of the self,” then one would be
able to assert that one’s body belongs to the specific individual in a certain sense. One’s
freedom to reign over one’s body is limited only because of the potential harm that could

70 This does not include those instances o f suicide that Kant sees as valid exceptions to the rule because a
higher duty has absolved them o f the duty to preserve one’s life.
71 An arational individual would not be allowed to make a moral decision to commit suicide because, unlike
animals, human beings possess rationality at one point in their life and the relationship of the mind and
body is what makes rationality possible. Due to this conditional relationship between the mind and a
specific body, one has a certain ownership o f file body and therefore has the right to make one’s own
choice as to how one’s body should be disposed of. If the individual is arational she is not competent to
make this choice and therefore would need the decision to be made by a previous rational self. An
arational individual, however, would be able to make some menial decisions such as how to dress or what
to eat, but the magnitude o f the decision to commit suicide is not well-suited for an individual in such a
state because of the complexity of the issue.
72 How one should make that choice and the issues o f autonomy that come into play will be addressed later.
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be caused to one’s humanity if harm is done to the physical body. If one is able to assert
limited control over one’s physical body while in possession of one’s rational capacities,
then it does not appear to be a stretch to say that one would still have control, even
complete ownership, of the body once the mind’s existence is no longer contingent upon
the body. What is meant by ‘control over the body’ is that the individual, having a special
connection to the body, is granted certain rights over it and its state in the same way a
parent is granted ‘control’ over a child. The child is not meant to be seen as an object, but
there are certain rights granted to the parent to be able to control the child to protect the
child’s best interests. The same is true for the body however, once the body no longer
maintains a conditional relationship with the mind, it becomes an object to be possessed.
In becoming an object, it also becomes the property of the individual, however, being that
the individual would no longer be in existence, the only way ownership could be exerted
would be through directions given in a will or an advanced directive.
To be able to use one’s rational capacities to exert ownership over the body as an
object, one must bridge the gap between the two. To do this one must rely on the rational
capacities of the individual, before one becomes an object, to deliberate as to what the
appropriate course of action should be for the body once one is no longer able to make
such choices. Individuals currently make similar decisions when establishing ‘do not
resuscitate’ orders (DNRs), where one bars medical personnel from using life saving
treatments to revive an individual once she has flat-lined. Like a DNR, an individual
would be able to determine how her body would be disposed o f once rational capacities
have ceased to exist.
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CHAPTER IV

THE END OF RATIONALITY

While it is clear that Kant values the body only in relation to the mind, it is not
clear at what point one has lost one’s rational functioning and is able to dispose over the
body as an object. To achieve such an understanding, one must be able to draw a
justifiable line between a rational human being and an arational human being. Given the
lack of guidance Kant provides to discern which individuals are arational, an appeal to
current standards of competency in medical settings will be examined. A full explanation
of what rationality “looks” like will not be presented; however, an initial judgment as to
what does or does not describe an arational individual will be discussed.
It has recently become common practice for the loss of brain functioning73, “brain
death,” to be considered akin to absolute death. Once brain death has been detected, it is
standard procedure to remove all life sustaining machines and treatments and to allow the
body to cease functioning. In a situation where a patient has reached a state of “brain
death,” a Kantian defense o f euthanasia would be easily applicable, because the total
cessation of brain activity is a clear case in which one no longer maintains the normal
conditional relationship between the body and the mind. Things become more

73

Discussion o f brain death and its acceptance can be found in: Ad Hoc Committee o f Harvard Medical
School, “A Definition of Irreversible Coma,” in Bioethics: An Anthology, ed. Helga Kuhse and Peter
Singer, (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 1999), 287-91. and Peter Singer, “Is the Sanctity o f Life
Ethic Terminally 111?,” in Bioethics: An Anthology, ed. Helga Kuhse and Peter Singer, (Malden, MA:
Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 1999), 292-304.
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complicated, however, when brain death is not involved, but one has lost one’s rational
capacities. This instance requires understanding what constitutes the loss of rational
functioning.
For Kant, rationality is an attribute of the mind, making it hard to observe
concrete variables to evaluate its presence. The state of brain death is an easy
determinant, because without functioning o f the mind rationality cannot exist.74 However,
prior to brain death one may lose the ability for rational thought, as is the case of an
individual who has reached the final stages o f Alzheimer’s disease and lives in a
permanent state of dementia. Evaluative standards for determining rationality are hard to
substantiate, given that Kant does not explicitly describe what rationality is supposed to
“look” like and also due to the inherent difficulty in trying to establish universal
standards that do not mistakenly rule out individuals that are rational. To be able to
accommodate situations where one has lost rational capacities prior to the cessation of
brain functioning, a continuum between full rational capacities and the absolute end of
brain functioning must be established.
Medical ethics has made significant efforts to address issues o f competent
decision making and valid consent. While these efforts help to address a decision about
one’s competency, they are not stringent enough to address the issue o f rational capacities
for Kant, because he is concerned with preserving humanity up until rational functioning
is completely lost. Competence is “best understood as specific rather than global: It

74 Brain death is an ‘easy determinant’ because we have the technology to be able to observe when brain
activity ceases. In the future technological advances could be made allowing for one to be able to observe
when rationality ceases to exist, but for now rationality remains undetectable through any measurement of
physiological processes.
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depends not only on a person’s abilities but also on how that person’s abilities match the
particular decision-making task he or she confronts.”75 This allows for the competency
status of an individual to vary based on the decision she is faced with.
The abilities taken into consideration when making competency evaluations are
normally not used together as a full set. Depending on the severity of the task, the
examiner may select only a few o f the capacities to measure. For example, if one were to
attempt to evaluate whether an individual is competent to choose what her diet consists
of, one may take into consideration only one’s ability to show preference. If, on the other
hand, one were evaluating an individual’s competency to agree to a major surgery, one
may have to demonstrate that she is capable o f making reasonable choices, understand
her situation, make cost-benefit analyses, and give rational reasons for her choice. One
can see, based on the aforementioned examples, that competence is a relative term. Kant,
however, requires that rationality evaluations have equal bearing on all decisions,
declaring the individual either rational or arational in every instance.
To address the needs o f Kant, a universal measuring stick must be used to
determine whether one is arational. To do so, it is instructive to take the common factors
that are considered in making competency evaluations and see how they apply to
rationality. The common factors for competence evaluations include:
1. Inability to express or communicate a preference or choice;
2. Inability to understand one’s situation and its consequences;
3. Inability to understand relevant information;
4. Inability to give a reason;

5. Inability to give a rational reason (although some supporting reasons may be
given);

75

Tom L. Beauchamps and James F. Childress, Principles o f Biomedical Ethics: Fifth Edition, (New York:
Oxford University Press, 2001), 70.
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6. Inability to give risk/benefit-related reasons (although some rational
supporting reasons may be given);
7. Inability to reach a reasonable decision (as judged, for example, by a
reasonable person standard76).77
The abilities listed above are helpful in discerning whether one is competent, however, it
is questionable as to whether these criteria, in any combination, are sufficient for making
a comprehensive evaluation of one’s rational abilities. The factors examined in a
competency evaluation seek to recognize if an individual is competent, however, they are
not necessarily good indicators o f incompetency. In examining the factors of competence
in relation to rationality, one will find that one cannot use these criteria to determine
rationality nor can they determine arrationality. One should merely take notice of the
inadequacy o f the current tools used to measure competency and in turn how these tools
serve as poor models for the determination of arrationality.
To begin, the ability to show or communicate a preference is not a quality that is
unique to human beings. Most animals are able to exert their preferences in one way or
another. For example, my cat displays her dietary preferences when she refuses to eat a
specific brand o f cat food. In addition, preferences for Kant have no moral bearing and
are attributed to the desires of the physical body. If I choose to eat chocolate ice cream
because it satiates my taste buds more so than strawberry, there are no moral implications
to the action, although the experience will be more gratifying for me.

76 A reasonable person standard takes into account a hypothetical reasonable person and asks what such a
person would consider to be significant in making the decision and consequently what a rational decision
would look like based on the information and situation.
77 Beauchamps & Childress, 73.
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Next, one’s ability to understand a situation and its consequences is also
insufficient, because a child, who is not yet a rational being, can understand her situation
and the possible consequences and still act contrary to duty. In a situation where a child
desires to purchase a new Barbie doll but does not have the money to do so, she may find
the opportunity to take money from her mother’s unattended purse to be too tempting to
resist. The child may know that stealing is wrong, because she has been told so by her
mother, and that if she is caught she will be severely punished, but she does not yet have
the capacity to understand that she must resist the inclination to steal because it is
contrary to her moral duty. Instead, she only knows that if she is caught she will be
punished, but if she gets away with it, the risk o f punishment will be worthwhile to her.
This example demonstrates that one may understand the situation and what consequences
may ensue depending on which choice is made, without having the full capacity to make
rational decisions in accord with moral duty.
One’s ability to understand relevant information also appears to be a weak
indicator of rational abilities. An individual may be able to process facts that are
presented to her, but may not have the capacity to manipulate a collection o f facts to
make appropriate decisions. For example, an individual may be given statistics about the
possible risk of infection from open heart surgery, but she may not be able to utilize the
statistics to make a reasonable decision as to whether the surgery is too risky to undergo,
for if she dies her child will be left without a mother. The individual may understand that
1 in 100 people die from infection, but she may not be able to weigh the duty to provide
for her daughter against the duty o f self-preservation.
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The ability for one to be able to give a reason is also substandard in determining
one’s rational capacities, for one could give any number of irrational reasons for making
a specific choice. For example, an individual may inform her doctor that she wants a
heart transplant because her father died of a heart attack and she is afraid because she
shares his genes she will too, even though her heart is healthy. In this case her reasoning
appears to make sense to her, even though there is a lack of evidence to support her need
for a transplant, making the request irrational.
Competency evaluations sometimes require that one is able to give a rational
reason for making a specific choice, however, the rational reasons given are not
necessarily akin to Kant’s “rational” reasoning standards. A rational reason may simply
be understood as a logical reason given after significant consideration of the situation has
occured; however, it may not be in accord with moral duty. An arational individual may
also give a rational reason on accident. In addition, if one considers a rational reason in
the sense Kant means it, this criterion would simply be begging the question as to
whether one was rational or arational. If one can give a rational reason then one has
rational capacities, but that still does not explain how to judge rationality.
Consideration o f risk/benefit related reasons are a necessary part of moral
reasoning for Kant, however, one’s ability to do so cannot, alone, constitute rationality. A
decision should not be based solely on risk/benefit evaluations, because they merely
consider what the best possible outcome would be for the individual and do not
necessarily consider moral duties.
Lastly, One’s ability to reach a reasonable decision would also fall short of a
Kantian measurement o f rationality, because the reasonable person standard takes an
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aggregate o f what the population deems to be a reasonable decision in a given situation,
but does not guarantee that the population has engaged in the appropriate moral
evaluations to reach a given decision.
At this point it appears that “brain death” may be the only viable way to make an
accurate distinction between an individual still in possession of her rationality and one
without. The components used to evaluate competency do not appear to hold up under the
pressure o f judging the loss of rationality. More stringent and exact measures need to be
determined by which one can judge arationality. Once standards forjudging rationality
have been successfully determined, the state of arationality may be used as an acceptable
standard o f ‘death’ as is currently the case with ‘brain death.’ An undertaking of this task
is significant and there is not enough space to address it sufficiently in the scope of this
essay. However, there are a few suggestions that can be made.
The criteria forjudging rationality should not take into consideration the body’s
physical appearance or health, because a body in peak condition may still lack a
connection with the brain, as in the case of irreversible coma. In addition, a body in poor
condition may still have an exceptional relationship with the mind, which has been
proven by the continued intellectual abilities of Stephen Hawking despite the physical
deterioration he has suffered due to Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis (ALS).78
Based on the primacy that Kant gives to the mind and rational capacities, the
physical body should not factor into one’s evaluation. Therefore, an evaluation o f one’s
rational capacities is a case purely o f the mind and should be evaluated by an individual

7®For more information about Stephen Hawking’s life and accomplishments, visit his website:
www.hawking.org
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knowledgeable in the functioning and capacities of the mind - a psychologist. The
psychologist, however, should not look for signs o f depression or other mental illness, but
instead make an objective decision about the rational abilities of the mind, based on
currently undetermined indicators of rationality. If one is found to be permanently
incapable of displaying rational functioning and has been for an extended period o f time,
then it is safe to declare the individual arational.
Once an individual is deemed arational and the relationship between the mind and
body is decidedly nonexistent, then the action of ending the physical body’s existence can
be considered ethical. While one may choose to terminate one’s physical body, an other
is unable to make a similar decision. The individual who is in possession of a specific
physical body is able to dispose over her body as she pleases once the body has become
an object. Because the individual is the only one entitled to make decisions about the
body, it is necessary that one anticipate the possibility of the physical body outliving the
mind and consequently make decisions about how one’s body should be treated.
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CHAPTER V

MODERN79 AUTONOMY VS. KANT’S AUTONOMY

It has been established that the only point at which Kant would allow for suicide
or euthanasia would be when the mind and the body no longer maintain a meaningful
relationship.80 Suicide is impossible under this theory, because it would require an
individual to actively destroy her life, which one is incapable of if the body has ceased to
help the mind function. In the case of euthanasia, barring physician-assisted suicide, one
requires another party to carry out the action. Since one is necessarily no longer able to
communicate one’s wishes and desires once one has reached a state where euthanasia is
morally acceptable, one must make the decision in advance and make it accessible to
others. This would take the form of an advanced directive and would require individuals
to respect one’s autonomy after rational capabilities have ceased. Before addressing the
process of creating an advanced directive, it is necessary to examine the idea of
autonomy and how it relates to the issue.
In the euthanasia debate, there are a number of competing definitions of
autonomy, some of which are wrongfully attributed Kant. In contemporary bioethics,

79 In this section ‘modem’ autonomy will be used in place of ‘Kantian’ autonomy to make the distinction
between contemporary Kantian theories o f autonomy and the original theory held by Kant clearer.
80 Although the conditional relationship between the mind and body has been severed, one still possesses a
sense o f ownership over one’s body. Therefore, it is the individual’s decision how and when her body is to
be disposed o f and the decision to do so should be made when she is still rational. The choice belongs to no
other.
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autonomy, for the most part, involves one’s self-determination and also the ability to
choose one’s own destiny without interference from outside parties. James Stacey Taylor
summarizes the Western conception of autonomy as “allowing] persons to form, revise,
ni

and pursue their own conceptions of the good.” These characteristics are found in
modem Kantian theories, as well as others; however, they are not sufficient82 to
constitute Kant’s own understanding of autonomy, which finds that “only those agents
who choose to act on the moral law from duty act autonomously.” Existing modem
definitions of autonomy will be examined and contrasted with Kant’s original definition
of autonomy.
In contemporary bioethics, modem autonomy is often understood to be the right
of the individual to express her will in determining the appropriate measures to take
concerning her health and well-being. Autonomy is understood “in terms of self-control,
self-direction, or self-governance. The individual capable o f acting on the basis of
effective deliberation, guided by reason, and neither driven by emotions or compulsions
nor manipulated or coerced by others is, on the [modem] position, the model of
autonomy.”84 This definition o f modem autonomy portrays autonomy as a part of a self
legislature that is of one’s choosing, not necessarily legislation governed by universal
moral laws. Kant’s autonomy is essentially “a matter of adopting law-like principles that

81 James Stacey Taylor, introduction to Personal Autonomy: New Essays on Personal Autonomy and Its
Role in Contemporary Moral Philosophy, by James Stacey Taylor, (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2005), 18.
82 These factors are necessary parts o f Kant’s autonomy, but they are not sufficient to constitute it.
83 Seeker, 47.
84 Seeker, 47. Quoting Mappes and DeGrazia, 1996. Seeker’s emphasis was removed.
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are independent of extraneous assumptions that can hold only for some and not other
agents.”85 The self-legislation that Kant talks about requires that one freely adopt a set of
universal moral principles which one will adhere to. Autonomy is the “capacity of lawo /

giving itself.” This means that it is not the individual that is autonomous, but instead it
is the reason inside the person that is autonomous. Kant’s understanding o f autonomy is
similar to the way in which he understands the value of one’s life in terms o f humanity
inside the individual. It is not necessarily the individual that requires self-preservation,
but instead it is the humanity inside the individual that demands it.
The difference between modem autonomy and Kant’s autonomy is that modem
autonomy concerns itself primarily with external factors whereas Kant is concerned with
internal factors. Modem autonomy lends itself to one’s ability to make choices based on
preferences and desires, which is fundamentally at odds with Kant’s autonomy and his
moral theory as a whole. In Kant’s original idea of autonomy, “a being with an
autonomous will, then, is one who is self-legislating, rather than subject to pre- or othergiven laws. The self-given laws of an autonomous agent are not just any laws, however;
these laws are given by the agent’s pure practical reason and the form those laws take,
according to Kant, is that of the one and only Categorical Imperative.”87 Modem
autonomy is primarily concerned with allowing an individual to have control over her life
in the sense that others will not infringe on her choice and will respect those personal

85 Friedrich Heubel and Nikola Biller-Andomo, “The contribution o f Kantian moral theory to contemporary
medical ethics: A critical analysis,” Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy, no. 8 (2005): 7. Quoting Onora
O’Neill, 2003.
86 Miyasaka, 20.
87 Seeker, 45.
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beliefs she has chosen to base her decision on. This allows for the individual to make
decisions based on means-end calculations and does not require that she further examine
the moral character of her chosen ends. Kant, on the other hand, regards autonomy as
one’s ability to self-govem (to make decisions in accordance with the moral law which
one has accepted as one’s own) and to make decisions in light of the universal moral
tenets that rationality is determined by. The ends an individual would choose would be
self-evident, because reason in the individual would hold up the appropriate ends based
on universal moral laws. For Kant, the individual may acknowledge other ends driven by
her inclinations or identity as a social being, but, ultimately, the ends endorsed by reason
must override all others. In upholding the modem principles, individuals could choose to
determine their life in a variety of ways, however, for Kant, there would be a limited set
of options based on the moral code.
An individual who desires to end her life because she anticipates a painful and
unpleasant death is inexcusable to Kant, because the individual is giving in to the desires
of the body and not using her rational capacities to make a judgment based on moral law.
An individual confronting a painful death has to stop and ask herself whether she wishes
to die because her current state makes her unhappy or if she should wish to live because
human life has worth until rationality and humanity cease to exist.
Kant’s autonomy requires that every autonomous decision is one made under the
guidance of the categorical imperative. One must ask whether the action one wishes to
take could become a universal maxim. It is possible for Kant’s autonomous agent to
make a decision that is not in accord with the moral principles dictated by one’s
autonomy, but it remains and immoral act. For a modem Kantian, one’s decision can only
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be immoral if it goes against the beliefs one has adopted as one’s own. There is no selfevident moral truth determined by the nature of being an autonomous agent that one must
measure one’s actions against. Modem autonomy does not require universality; in fact, it
favors plurality in that it is meant to allow an individual to make a decision based on
personalized beliefs that are not shared by all. For Kant, a plurality of beliefs is only
acceptable if the differing beliefs hold the same moral status. Kant requires that all
individuals subscribe to the same basic moral principles and thereby govern themselves
under such principles. The fundamental error made by those who subscribe to modem
autonomy is that they take Kant’s definition of autonomy and use his words to mean
something different. Modem Kantians may refer to self-legislation as Kant originally did,
but its meaning does not align with Kant’s philosophy. Since “autonomy of the will is the
central concept in Kant’s moral philosophy,”88 it is a grave mistake to misunderstand
Kant’s definition of autonomy.
One can see where modem autonomy and Kant’s original definition of autonomy
diverge and how important it is to make such a distinction. The two definitions are
fundamentally different, and if one were to evaluate a situation using both theories, they
would most likely produce drastically different outcomes. Kant’s original conception of
autonomy is most suited for addressing the current conversation about euthanasia,
because it is universal and it also preserves the integrity of both natural and moral laws.
In an instance where one would choose to be euthanized once one has lost one’s rational
capacities, Kant’s definition of autonomy not only respects our natural duty of selfpreservation, but the maxim is in accord with universal moral law.

88 Seeker, 45.
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CHAPTER VI

EUTHANASIA, ADVANCED DIRECTIVES, AND KANT’S AUTONOMY

One’s choice to be euthanized is only acceptable once an individual has passed
the point of arationality. To be able to effect a desire to be euthanized, one would have to
deliberate about the issue and put into place an advanced directive. Kant would allow for
an advanced directive, because the autonomous choice is in line with both the natural and
moral laws by which an individual is governed.
Establishing an advanced directive is in agreement with the natural law,
specifically one’s duty o f self-preservation, because the decision being made only affects
the physical body once it is in a state o f decay. One looks after one’s body and keeps it
out of harm’s way to avoid any potential harm to the body that would consequently cause
harm to one’s existence, more specifically to one’s rationality and humanity. An
individual cannot exist only as a body; once an individual is reduced to a mere physical
form, one is no longer obligated to preserve one’s self, because one’s “existence” has
already ceased. Therefore, once the conditional relationship between the mind and the
body is severed, one is no longer obligated by natural law to preserve oneself.
Kant’s primary objection to suicide and euthanasia revolves around the
contradiction o f using one’s will (the bedrock of morality) to destroy itself and
consequently morality. To be able to get around this contradiction, one would essentially
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have to experience a separation between the physical body and one’s rationality, which is
achieved once one has become arational, upon which the body becomes an object
belonging to the individual. In creating an advanced directive, an individual would-be
making a decision disposing over her body in the future once it is a mere object.
The moral choice expressed in an advanced directive is in line with Kant’s idea of
autonomy, because the maxim of the action can become a universal law. In every
instance, one is willing an action pertaining to the disposal of an object by the individual
who had an intimate relationship with it. Humanity is fully preserved by the individual
and once humanity ceases to exist in the physical object, one can choose to destroy it for
whatever reasons one chooses. The individual has adhered to all moral laws and duties
and now may act to dispose of humanity’s vessel in the way she finds most suitable. An
individual may decide to be euthanized in order not to squander resources on a physical
object that no longer possesses the value it once did. Or one may make the decision in
order not prolong the anguish of friends and family members who patiently sit by and
watch one’s body deteriorate.
Not only is the choice to be euthanized, under the above conditions, in line with
Kant’s moral theory, it also avoids a number of objections waged against the use of
Kant’s theory of autonomy in bioethical issues. Many consider the use of Kant’s ethics in
bioethics to be problematic, because Kant requires “too much” of an individual in making
rational decisions about medical procedures. Kant’s concept of autonomy is often deemed
to be an “idealistic concept.. .of little practical relevance in health contexts where
patients, on the whole, bear little resemblance to the Kantian free, independent,
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exclusively rational individual.”89 The inconsistency of an individual displaying signs of
reduced rational capacities complicates the process of judging one’s rational abilities and
may in fact render the individual incompetent for Kant. Some of the common
complicating factors include “internal constraints [such as] pain, anxiety, fear,
depression, effects of treatment, lack of information, inadequate understanding, and false
beliefs.”90 External constraints also include “pressure from relatively powerful health
care professionals, and from friends and family members. Institutional environments
themselves are often disorienting and restrictive, controlling patients in various ways.”91
While all of these constraints can reasonably have an effect on a patient, being limited to
establishing an advanced directive alleviates the individual of all these pressures. Because
the decision is made in advance, the individual will not have to deal with the typical
stressors that come with illness and end o f life care. One is able to ruminate for as long as
necessary and to do so in an environment that is conducive to making an autonomous
rational decision.
Kant’s moral theory, upon examination, lends itself well to the issue of euthanasia
and is able to allow for a moral choice in choosing to end one’s life. The necessity of an
advanced directive not only makes the choice moral, but it also benefits the individual,
since it lends itself to allowing for a rational choice in an amicable environment.

89 Seeker, 49.
90 Ibid., 49.
91 Ibid., 49.
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CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

An ethical examination of euthanasia is a necessarily complicated process, for it is
not only a sensitive issue, but also requires an exploration of a variety of issues such as
autonomy, the connection between the mind and body, rational thought, and many other
complicating factors. The theory of Immanuel Kant lends itself nicely to the topic of
euthanasia, since the foundation o f his moral theory revolves around the issue of
autonomy - the most widely discussed concept within the euthanasia debate.
While Kant revealed his great disdain for suicide in his writings, he did not
completely condemn it. The instances in which Kant allowed for exceptions provide a
foundation for a case for euthanasia. Euthanasia, like suicide, for Kant, is only
permissible in limited cases, namely, where one is capable o f planning appropriately for
terminal illness or other situations that bring one near the end of life. Once an individual
has passed the point of arationality, she may request to be euthanized. The conditional
relationship that Kant acknowledges between the body and the mind allows the individual
to terminate the continued existence of the physical body once the mind is no longer
bound by it. This necessarily would have to be accomplished by a rational individual’s
autonomous decision in the form o f an advanced directive. Advanced directives not only
allow one the option of euthanasia, but also provide a means for Kantian theory, as
applied to bioethics, to avoid many of the traditional objections.
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